> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.tapir.money/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.tapir.money/incentives.md).

# Incentives

## Incentives overview

Tapir rewards two contributions: **capital held in its pools** and **liquidity that helps people trade DP and YB**. Eligible holders earn points based on the value and duration of their position. Eligible liquidity providers earn those holding points too, plus a second stream based on the trading fees their position earns.

You choose the position that fits your goals: DP for depeg protection, YB for additional depeg exposure, or an LP position to earn trading fees. Points are an extra incentive for eligible participation. They do not change the position's protection, yield, or loss mechanics.

![Hold DP or YB for holding points; provide liquidity for holding points plus eligible fee points. Raw points pass through caps and checks before becoming finalized points.](https://290230942-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Ffs2icldWo64X9laOubjf%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-aaa06c773abc5757bae3f538d40f09b88ce76e47%2Fpoints-two-earning-channels.svg?alt=media)

### How it works, from participation to tokens

1. **Choose an eligible pool and position.** Each pool publishes its own incentive dates and settings. Holding vault shares outside Tapir does not earn these points.
2. **Earn raw points.** Holding points depend on eligible capital kept for complete UTC days. LP fee points depend on eligible fees earned, whether or not you have collected them.
3. **The program checks and finalizes each epoch.** An epoch is normally one week. Holding and fee points have separate pool-wide caps. Fee points also pass through external-volume and per-owner caps first. When the remaining channel total exceeds its cap, participants' points scale down proportionally; an unused cap is not paid out automatically.
4. **Finalized points convert at 1:1 to TPR.** Token access follows the token launch and unlock schedule. Raw estimates are not finalized entitlements, and points have no fixed dollar value.

### A simple holding-versus-liquidity example

Using the **approved Zircuit starting rates**, subject to activation, assume your eligible principal is valued at $10,000 throughout seven complete UTC days. For the LP example, also assume your position earns $11 in eligible fees during that week.

| Position                |         Raw holding points | Raw LP-fee points | Raw total |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------: | ----------------: | --------: |
| Hold DP and/or YB       | $10,000 × 7 × 0.02 = 1,400 |                 — | **1,400** |
| Provide DP/YB liquidity | $10,000 × 7 × 0.02 = 1,400 | $11 × 116 = 1,276 | **2,676** |

The LP earns both streams; its extra points depend on fees actually earned. These are examples before caps and validation, using the pool's approved starting rates. They are not cash returns. Underlying-asset performance and swap fees remain separate, and an LP's changing inventory carries [additional risks](/system-workflow/liquidity.md#risks).

### Why participation timing matters

Starting earlier within an active incentive window gives a position more eligible days before the pool ends. Participation also matters: as more capital or eligible fees compete for a fixed epoch cap, each raw point can receive a smaller allocation after scaling. An early position can face less competition, but this depends on actual activity and the authorized caps; joining early does not lock in a higher rate.

![Illustrative cumulative points for holding a $10,000 position versus providing liquidity, with both curves flattening as modeled participation grows beyond an epoch cap.](https://290230942-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Ffs2icldWo64X9laOubjf%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-be5b80b4d6d7801085783d2e35e16cc3e4632ff3%2Fpoints-hold-vs-liquidity.svg?alt=media)

*This illustrative chart models pool TVL rising to $200,000 and then $1,000,000 by maturity. It is a hypothetical scaling scenario; the current Zircuit schedule instead plans a ramp to $200,000 followed by steady TVL. The liquidity line includes holding and fee points. Actual channel caps, eligible fees, and ownership controls determine finalized points; the chart is not a projection of rewards.*

**Current pool status:** the [Zircuit USDC incentives](/live-markets/live-markets/zircuit-usdc-90d-base/zircuit-usdc-incentives.md) have an approved **314,700-point schedule**, comprising 278,000 TVL points and 36,700 AMM points as ceilings through maturity. Point earning is planned from **September 25, 2026 at 00:00 UTC**, separate from the planned September 22 public pool opening. Activation still requires complete accounting inputs, implemented controls, assigned operators, and validation. Approval is not evidence that accrual or withdrawals are live. No TPR dollar value is stated.

The sections below introduce eligibility, calculations, epoch caps, and unlocks. The [full points and liquidity incentive specification in Resources](/resources/points-program.md) contains the complete document, including all formulas, worked calculations, and controls. See [Planned Tokenomics](/tokenomics.md) for the planned token allocation, or [Content Contribution](/incentives/content-contribution.md) for the separate contribution initiative.

## What earns points?

| Position                            | TVL points                                                         | AMM points                                                  |
| ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
| Eligible DP and/or YB held directly | Yes, on eligible principal held for a complete UTC day             | No                                                          |
| Eligible directly owned LP position | Yes, on attributable DP/YB principal                               | Yes, on eligible fee growth while you own the position      |
| Managed or custody position         | Attribution to the end user requires an approved ownership adapter | The same ownership requirement applies                      |
| Unclaimed LP fees                   | Excluded from TVL principal                                        | Count when earned if eligible, regardless of when collected |

The program combines your direct wallet principal and attributable LP principal without counting the same tokens twice. Out-of-range LP principal can still qualify for TVL points; AMM points depend on eligible fees actually earned. Holding the vault asset outside an eligible Tapir position does not itself earn these Tapir points.

### TVL points: a complete UTC day

For each day, the program uses the **lowest combined DP/YB principal you economically owned throughout that day**, multiplied by the pool asset's value under its points-accounting method:

```
Raw TVL points for a day = α × minimum eligible principal × pool-asset value
```

α is the pool's TVL multiplier, expressed as points per dollar per day. There is no global default: each activated pool publishes its own parameters. Zircuit's approved starting value is 0.02. The default valuation uses current economic value, including a vault share's conversion rate and the reference asset's dollar price. The [Zircuit incentive configuration](/live-markets/live-markets/zircuit-usdc-90d-base/zircuit-usdc-incentives.md) has an explicit points-only exception that fixes the zUSDC dollar factor.

A deposit or transfer-in partway through a UTC day can increase your eligible principal only from the next complete day. A transfer-out, burn, or removal that reduces your combined eligible principal lowers that day's minimum immediately. Moving principal between your wallet and your directly owned LP position preserves eligibility when economic ownership continues through the transaction. Transferring the LP NFT to someone else changes ownership for the transferred principal.

For example, with α = 0.02, a minimum balance of 1,000 eligible principal units and a points value of $1.05 per unit earns **21 raw points for one complete day**. A midday addition does not increase that day's result. This is points arithmetic, not a dollar return.

### AMM points: eligible fees earned

```
Raw AMM points for an epoch = β × eligible LP fees valued in dollars
```

β is the pool's AMM multiplier. Fee growth is attributed to the position owner during the period it accrued, including changes in ownership or liquidity. Collecting fees later does not move their earn date. Protocol fees and fees from directly or beneficially self-dealing trades are excluded; each pool must also publish its rules for linked round trips and related-owner concentration.

An LP can earn both channels. The AMM channel also applies an external-volume ceiling and a per-owner cap before channel-wide scaling. These controls can reduce points even when the raw channel total is below its epoch target. Providing liquidity does not fix the number of points or remove the [risks of holding an LP position](/system-workflow/liquidity.md).

Zircuit's approved β = 116 operates under a subsidy-ratio exception that expires at pool maturity. It requires a **40% per-owner AMM cap** and an external-volume cap, and disables automatic β increases. Its AMM targets decline as the pool's dynamic trading fee falls. The exception and controls bound exposure; they do not make self-dealing or undisclosed related ownership fully detectable.

## From raw points to finalized points

Accounting uses **seven-day epochs** by default. Each pool has a separate ceiling for TVL points and AMM points in each epoch. Parameters and ceilings must be published before the affected epoch begins.

For TVL, scaling compares the raw total with the channel ceiling. For AMM, it compares the total remaining after the external-volume and per-owner caps. If that total is below the ceiling, no further reduction applies; if it exceeds the ceiling, every participant's remaining points in that channel are multiplied by the same factor:

```
Scaling factor = min(1, channel ceiling / total points entering channel scaling)
```

If the total entering channel scaling is zero, the factor is defined as 1 and the result remains zero.

For example, if a TVL channel produces 100,000 raw points against an 80,000-point ceiling, 1,000 raw TVL points become **800 points after scaling**. The AMM channel is calculated separately. Unused capacity does not move between channels during the same epoch.

A provisional ledger is published for review. Zircuit requires publication within 24 hours of epoch end and a 72-hour challenge window; the operational process still needs to be completed before activation. Source or ownership errors can be challenged during the pool's published challenge window. Points finalize after accepted corrections, scaling, rounding, and the program-budget check. Missing or stale required data pauses finalization. A balance shown before these checks can change.

The routine program is capped at **120 million finalized points**, backed by the corresponding proposed TPR allocation. Another **30 million TPR** is reserved separately. Budget capacity is committed before each epoch through a serialized authorization register so finalized points keep the fixed 1:1 conversion. A program-wide rolling four-epoch cap also limits the rate of commitments across pools; a pool-only ceiling cannot replace it.

Multipliers can adjust prospectively after eligible epochs finalize: an undershoot can raise the future multiplier, and an overshoot can lower it, unless a pool-specific restriction applies. Each adjustment starts from the source epoch's multiplier, is limited to ×0.7–×1.4 of the live multiplier, and must also satisfy global bounds and the pool's rate ceiling. Only the latest eligible queued adjustment applies at a boundary.

Launch epochs and zero, below-floor, incomplete, or disputed observations do not feed automatic adjustment. The observation floor is normally **25% of that channel's epoch target**. Four consecutive below-floor eligible epochs freeze the channel's multiplier and remove targets only from epochs that have not begun. An epoch already underway keeps its published parameters and commitment.

For Zircuit, Epochs 1–4 are launch epochs. The first eligible feedback observation is Epoch 5, and the earliest resulting adjustment is Epoch 7 after finalization. Its maximum rates are 13.33 points per TVL dollar per year and 8.33 points per AMM TVL dollar per year. These are point rates, not cash returns.

## When can TPR unlock?

Each finalized point automatically establishes one TPR of entitlement. Points cannot be transferred or traded, and there is no separate transaction to claim a locked allocation. The specification preserves the UTC date each contribution earned its points; finalization and fee collection do not reset that date:

```
Lot unlock = Unlock Start Date (U) + (Point earn date − Program start (T0))
```

The planned global program-start reference is **September 25, 2026 at 00:00 UTC**, subject to activation readiness. Each pool has its own eligibility window. The Unlock Start Date will be announced separately and is expected shortly after TGE and the public sale; there is no fixed date or waiting period. The announcement must respect the program's published notice period.

Daily token lots unlock in the same sequence and amounts as the points were earned. A lot becomes eligible only after both its scheduled unlock and ledger finalization. Late finalization makes an overdue lot eligible immediately, while late withdrawal does not restart its schedule. While U is unannounced, allocations can finalize but no point-program TPR is eligible for withdrawal.

Tapir plans to announce TGE and its date when protocol TVL reaches **$10 million**. That milestone concerns the date announcement and does not trigger point-token unlocks. The proposed schedule, Unlock Start Date, and TGE/public-sale timing and milestone remain subject to change. The distribution mechanism requires implementation, funding, and validation before withdrawals open.

Read [Planned Tokenomics](/tokenomics.md) for the proposed TPR allocation and governance design. Published incentive rates use points per dollar of eligible capital per year; no TPR reference price or incentive APR is stated. The 1:1 token conversion does not establish a fixed cash value.

## Before relying on an incentive

Check the pool page for activated dates, eligible contracts, current multipliers, authorized ceilings, and valuation rules. The published accounting terms must also identify how balances and fees are attributed, how to challenge a provisional result, and when it can finalize. Do not infer points eligibility from a contract being Active or from a marketing return example.

The program remains a working specification. See the [full disclaimer](/resources/points-program.md#disclaimer) for the terms, limitations, and risks. Finalized entitlements are not recalculated retroactively; prospective terms and provisional balances can change under the specification.