> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.tapir.money/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.tapir.money/resources/points-program.md).

# Points & Liquidity Incentive Specification (Full)

Version 6 · Updated September 18, 2026 · Publication edits October 27, 2026.

For an introduction, see [Incentives](https://docs.tapir.money/incentives.md). For pool-specific settings and the per-epoch schedule, see [Zircuit USDC incentives](https://docs.tapir.money/live-markets/live-markets/zircuit-usdc-90d-base/zircuit-usdc-incentives.md). This is a working specification. Point earning for the Zircuit pool started on September 25, 2026; publication does not establish that token withdrawals are live.

## 1. Overview

This document specifies Tapir Protocol's liquidity incentive point program. It rewards two measurable contributions: capital held in Depeg Pool positions and fees earned by liquidity positions in the corresponding Automated Market Maker (AMM).

The program converts every finalized point into one TPR at a fixed 1:1 ratio. Per-pool targets cap each epoch before points are finalized, and a program-level budget check prevents total finalized points from exceeding the 120,000,000 TPR point allocation. The separate 30,000,000 TPR reserve is not part of routine point issuance.

### 1.1 Token Allocation Summary

| Parameter                             | Value                               |
| ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- |
| Total Supply                          | 1,000,000,000 TPR                   |
| Liquidity Incentives Allocation       | 150,000,000 TPR (15%)               |
| Reserve (held back from distribution) | 30,000,000 TPR (20% of allocation)  |
| Distributable via Points              | 120,000,000 TPR (80% of allocation) |

***

## 2. Definitions

### 2.1 Core Terms

| Term                    | Definition                                                                                                                                                           |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **TPR**                 | The governance token of Tapir Protocol                                                                                                                               |
| **Depeg Pool**          | A pool identified by $$p$$, with one deposited asset, a unique DP/YB token pair, and an associated AMM                                                               |
| **DP**                  | Depeg Protected token. DP and YB are minted in equal amounts from the pool asset, retain the asset's base yield, and differ in their claims if a depeg is resolved   |
| **YB**                  | Yield Boosted token. DP and YB are minted in equal amounts from the pool asset, retain the asset's base yield, and differ in their claims if a depeg is resolved     |
| **AMM**                 | Automated Market Maker associated with a Depeg Pool for trading its DP/YB pair                                                                                       |
| **LP**                  | Liquidity Provider, an account that owns or is attributed a position in the pool's AMM                                                                               |
| **TVL**                 | Total Value Locked. For this program, it is the attributable US dollar value of eligible DP and YB principal                                                         |
| **Epoch**               | A discrete accounting period, with a default duration of 7 days                                                                                                      |
| **TGE**                 | Token Generation Event, the planned token-launch milestone associated with the public sale; distinct from the start of point-program token unlocks                   |
| **Point Program Start** | $$T\_0$$, the first eligible earning day of the global points program, at 00:00 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). Its calendar date is a program-configuration input |
| **Unlock Start Date**   | $$U$$, the separately announced start of token unlocks, expected some time after TGE and the public sale. No calendar date or fixed waiting period is set here       |
| **Pool Asset**          | The asset deposited into a Depeg Pool to mint DP and YB. It may itself be a vault or wrapper share                                                                   |
| **Reference Asset**     | The asset represented by a vault or wrapper share. Its USD price is one input to the Pool Asset's unit value                                                         |
| **Finalized Point**     | A point in an epoch ledger after source data, ownership attribution, scaling, and program-budget checks are complete                                                 |

### 2.2 Mathematical Notation

| Symbol                                   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| ---------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| $$t$$                                    | Current timestamp                                                                                                                                                                               |
| $$T\_0$$                                 | First eligible global point-earning day (00:00 UTC), supplied by program configuration                                                                                                          |
| $$U$$                                    | Unlock Start Date, to be announced separately                                                                                                                                                   |
| $$e$$                                    | Current epoch number where $$e \in {1, 2, 3, \ldots}$$                                                                                                                                          |
| $$d$$                                    | Day index within an epoch                                                                                                                                                                       |
| $$D(e)$$                                 | Number of days in epoch $$e$$ (default: 7)                                                                                                                                                      |
| $$d\_1$$                                 | First day of an epoch (day index 1)                                                                                                                                                             |
| $$d\_{D(e)}$$                            | Last day of epoch $$e$$ (typically day 7)                                                                                                                                                       |
| $$p$$                                    | Depeg Pool identifier (each pool has unique DP/YB pair + AMM)                                                                                                                                   |
| $$\alpha\_p(e)$$                         | TVL point multiplier for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (adjusts dynamically)                                                                                                                        |
| $$\beta\_p(e)$$                          | AMM point multiplier for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (adjusts dynamically)                                                                                                                        |
| $$\gamma$$                               | Dampening factor for multiplier adjustments (default: 0.5)                                                                                                                                      |
| $$q\_p(d)$$                              | USD value of one unit of pool $$p$$'s Pool Asset on day $$d$$, including any wrapper or vault share exchange rate                                                                               |
| $$\overline{H}\_{i,p}(d)$$               | Minimum combined DP and YB principal economically owned by account $$i$$ throughout UTC day $$d$$                                                                                               |
| $$F\_{i,p}(d)$$                          | Eligible LP fee growth attributed to account $$i$$ on UTC day $$d$$, in USD                                                                                                                     |
| $$F\_{i,p}(e)$$                          | Eligible LP fee growth attributed to account $$i$$ during epoch $$e$$, in USD                                                                                                                   |
| $$p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d)$$               | Raw TVL points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ on day $$d$$                                                                                                                                   |
| $$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$  | Raw TVL points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (before scaling)                                                                                                                |
| $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$  | Raw AMM points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (before scaling)                                                                                                                |
| $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$    | Total raw TVL points from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (before scaling)                                                                                                                            |
| $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$    | Total raw AMM points from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (before scaling)                                                                                                                            |
| $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Authorized target TVL points for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$                                                                                                                                      |
| $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Authorized target AMM points for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$                                                                                                                                      |
| $$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$            | TVL scaling factor for pool $$p$$ (1 if undershoot, <1 if overshoot)                                                                                                                            |
| $$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$            | AMM scaling factor for pool $$p$$ (1 if undershoot, <1 if overshoot)                                                                                                                            |
| $$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$               | Final TVL points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (after scaling)                                                                                                               |
| $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$               | Final AMM points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (after scaling)                                                                                                               |
| $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$                 | Total final TVL points from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (after scaling)                                                                                                                           |
| $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$                 | Total final AMM points from pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (after scaling)                                                                                                                           |
| $$P\_i(e)$$                              | Total final points earned by account $$i$$ during epoch $$e$$                                                                                                                                   |
| $$P(e)$$                                 | Total final points across all accounts in epoch $$e$$                                                                                                                                           |
| $$T\_i(e)$$                              | TPR entitlement finalized for account $$i$$ in epoch $$e$$ (equals $$P\_i(e)$$)                                                                                                                 |
| $$B\_{\text{program}}$$                  | Maximum routine point budget: 120,000,000 points                                                                                                                                                |
| $$B\_{\text{spent}}(t)$$                 | Finalized routine points as of time $$t$$                                                                                                                                                       |
| $$B\_{\text{committed}}(t)$$             | Authorized ceilings for epochs that are not yet finalized as of time $$t$$                                                                                                                      |
| $$B\_{\text{free}}(t)$$                  | Routine budget not spent or committed as of time $$t$$                                                                                                                                          |
| $$C(e)$$                                 | Sum of authorized channel targets for epoch $$e$$                                                                                                                                               |
| $$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$                      | TPR reference price in USD. An unpublished planning input used to solve and bound multipliers. It is **not published** in any pool configuration or public document, and no value is given here |
| $$R\_{\max,p}$$                          | Maximum incentive rate published for pool $$p$$, per channel, in points per US dollar of capital per year                                                                                       |
| $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$                     | Maximum share of the AMM channel's epoch target payable to one attributed owner                                                                                                                 |
| $$r\_{\text{turnover}}$$                 | Daily AMM volume divided by AMM TVL                                                                                                                                                             |
| $$r\_{\text{fee}}$$                      | AMM fee rate                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| $$\varepsilon$$                          | Elasticity of participating capital to the advertised incentive rate                                                                                                                            |

**Note:** One finalized point converts into one TPR. Raw and provisional calculations do not create a TPR entitlement.

### 2.3 Accounting and Finalization Rules

Each pool's published incentive configuration must define its activation timestamp, end timestamp, eligible contracts and lifecycle states, Pool Asset valuation method, source sampling and aggregation, staleness limit, chain-finality policy, point targets, multipliers, maximum incentive rate per channel, launch-epoch designation, ownership adapters, observation floor, per-owner channel cap, wind-down epoch count, self-dealing rules, and challenge-window duration. A pool cannot activate under this specification until those fields are present, and it earns no points outside that scope.

* Epochs are contiguous. Epoch 1 starts at $$T\_0$$, and each later epoch starts when the preceding epoch ends. Its end is its start plus $$D(e)$$ complete 24-hour UTC days. A governance change to $$D(e)$$ takes effect only at an epoch boundary and must be published before the affected epoch begins.
* A UTC day is the half-open interval from 00:00:00 UTC through, but excluding, the next 00:00:00 UTC. TVL points accrue only for complete UTC days inside both the epoch and the pool's active incentive window. AMM points accrue from eligible fee growth over the exact active portion of an epoch.
* Parameters and targets are frozen before an epoch begins. A later change applies prospectively, except for a documented correction to erroneous source data or attribution.
* The accounting operator reconstructs balances, ownership, liquidity, and fee growth from canonical blocks that satisfy the configured chain-finality policy. Transactions use their block timestamp; one at a UTC boundary belongs to the new day. Each epoch's published accounting metadata identifies the exact chain, contract addresses, first and last block, valuation inputs, finality rule, and code or query version used.
* A provisional ledger is subject to the challenge window in the pool configuration. Points become finalized only after accepted corrections, channel scaling, and the program-budget check in Section 4.2.3.
* Calculations use full available precision. At finalization, each account's exact epoch result is rounded down to 18 decimal places. The rounded amount is allocated to daily lots with the largest-remainder method: floor every exact daily lot to 18 decimals, then assign the remaining indivisible units to the largest fractional remainders, with earlier earn date as the tie-breaker. Residual below the account-level precision remains in the unspent program budget.
* Missing or stale chain or price data pauses finalization for the affected pool and period. It does not permit estimated inputs. A protocol or AMM pause does not by itself stop TVL accrual while capital remains eligible; AMM points naturally fall with eligible fee growth. The pool configuration may define a stricter stop condition.

### 2.4 Migration from Earlier Configurations

Pool configurations written against v5 remain valid planning inputs for their stated addresses, activation windows, multipliers, and targets, but they do not automatically supply the new accounting fields in Section 2.3. Before a pool can activate or finalize another epoch under v6, its configuration or a published addendum must supply those fields. Previously finalized ledgers are not recalculated retroactively. Their published specification version and content hash remain part of the audit trail.

***

## 3. Point Earning Mechanisms

Points are earned through two mechanisms: TVL contribution and AMM liquidity provision. Both use reconstructable on-chain inputs. Section 4.6 describes the remaining manipulation risks and controls.

***

### 3.1 TVL-Based Points

TVL points reward users for holding DP and/or YB tokens. Each Depeg Pool $$p$$ has a unique DP/YB token pair, and points are calculated per pool with its own multiplier and point target.

#### 3.1.1 Eligibility Criteria

* Only complete UTC days are counted. A day's eligible principal is the minimum combined DP and YB principal that the account economically owns throughout the day.
* A transfer-in, mint, or newly added liquidity can increase eligible principal only on the next complete UTC day. A transfer-out, burn, or liquidity removal reduces the current day's minimum immediately.
* Moving principal between a wallet and a directly owned LP position does not reset eligibility if economic ownership remains with the same account throughout the transaction. Transferring the LP non-fungible token (NFT) changes economic ownership and resets eligibility for the transferred principal on that day.
* Direct wallet balances and attributable LP principal are aggregated before taking the daily minimum. DP and YB held by technical custody contracts, including the AMM pool and position manager, are not also credited as wallet balances.
* AMM LP positions earn TVL points on attributable principal and AMM points on attributable fee growth. Unclaimed fees are excluded from TVL principal. Once collected, fees are an ordinary DP or YB balance and are treated like any other balance, with no tracing of their origin. Collected fee income can therefore earn AMM points and subsequently earn TVL points as principal. This is intentional: the amount is bounded by the pool's own fee flow and is immaterial against the channel targets, and tracing the provenance of every balance through transfers would cost far more accounting complexity than it recovers.

#### 3.1.2 Raw TVL Points per Account per Pool (Daily)

For account $$i$$ holding tokens from Depeg Pool $$p$$ on day $$d$$:

$$p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d) = \alpha\_p(e) \cdot \overline{H}\_{i,p}(d) \cdot q\_p(d)$$

**Variable Definitions:**

| Variable                   | Description                                                                    |
| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| $$p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d)$$ | Raw TVL points earned by account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ on day $$d$$            |
| $$\alpha\_p(e)$$           | TVL point multiplier for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (adjusts dynamically)       |
| $$\overline{H}\_{i,p}(d)$$ | Minimum combined DP and YB principal economically owned throughout the UTC day |
| $$q\_p(d)$$                | USD value of one Pool Asset unit under the pool's published valuation method   |

For a direct asset, $$q\_p(d)$$ is its observed USD value. For a wrapper or vault share, the configuration must apply the on-chain share-to-reference-asset exchange rate before the reference asset's USD price. The program uses current economic value, including any depeg, rather than assuming a $1 peg or using the Depeg Pool's high-watermark settlement value. A pool may instead adopt a fixed accounting value for its reference asset only where its configuration publishes that convention, states its scope, and records that it is an accounting convention and not a claim about a market or redemption price. A stale or unavailable input invokes the finalization hold in Section 2.3.

The combined-principal formula treats one DP or one YB as one Pool Asset unit only while that treatment is valid in the lifecycle states authorized by the pool configuration. If a resolved depeg gives DP and YB different known claims, TVL finalization pauses unless the configuration already defines claim-specific DP and YB valuation formulas.

**Example:**

> Account's combined DP and YB principal never falls below 150 units during the day. One Pool Asset unit is worth $2,000. With $$\alpha\_p = 0.02$$:
>
> $$p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d) = 0.02 \times 150 \times 2{,}000 = 6{,}000 \text{ raw points}$$

#### 3.1.3 Raw TVL Points per Account per Pool (Epoch)

The raw TVL points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$ over epoch $$e$$, spanning days $$d\_1$$ through $$d\_{D(e)}$$:

$$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_{d=d\_1}^{d\_{D(e)}} p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d)$$

#### 3.1.4 Raw TVL Points per Pool (Epoch)

Total raw TVL points across all accounts for pool $$p$$:

$$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$

#### 3.1.5 Pool-Level Scaling Factor (TVL)

If a pool's raw points exceed its target, a scaling factor is applied to cap total points at the target. If raw points are at or below target, no scaling is applied.

$$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \min\left(1, \frac{P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)}{P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)}\right)$$

If raw TVL points are zero, $$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$ is defined as 1 and final TVL points are zero.

| Condition  | $$\kappa$$ | Effect                           |
| ---------- | ---------- | -------------------------------- |
| Undershoot | $$= 1$$    | Points unchanged                 |
| On target  | $$= 1$$    | Points unchanged                 |
| Overshoot  | $$< 1$$    | Points scaled down to hit target |

#### 3.1.6 Final TVL Points per Account per Pool (Epoch)

Apply the scaling factor to get final points:

$$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) \cdot P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$

#### 3.1.7 Final TVL Points per Pool (Epoch)

Total final TVL points across all accounts for pool $$p$$:

$$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$

**Note:** Due to scaling, $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) \leq P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ always holds before account-level rounding.

**Example: Overshoot (Scaling Applied)**

> Pool $$p$$ has $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) = 1{,}000{,}000$$ points.
>
> Three holders have raw points of 800,000, 600,000, and 400,000:
>
> * Total raw: $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}} = 1{,}800{,}000$$ points (overshoot)
>
> Scaling factor: $$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}} = \frac{1{,}000{,}000}{1{,}800{,}000} = \frac{5}{9}$$
>
> **Final points (scaled):**
>
> * Holder₁: $$800{,}000 \times \tfrac{5}{9} = 444{,}444.\overline{4}$$
> * Holder₂: $$600{,}000 \times \tfrac{5}{9} = 333{,}333.\overline{3}$$
> * Holder₃: $$400{,}000 \times \tfrac{5}{9} = 222{,}222.\overline{2}$$
> * **Total: 1,000,000** (equals target)
>
> The exact scaling factor is carried through to each account, per the full-precision rule in Section 2.3. Rounding each holder to whole points instead would total 999,999 and leave a 1-point residual in the unspent program budget.

**Example: Undershoot (No Scaling)**

> Pool $$p$$ has $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) = 100{,}000$$ points.
>
> Two holders have raw points of 30,000 and 20,000:
>
> * Total raw: $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}} = 50{,}000$$ points (undershoot)
>
> Scaling factor: $$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}} = 1$$ (no scaling)
>
> **Final points (unchanged):**
>
> * Holder₁: $$30{,}000 \times 1 = 30{,}000$$
> * Holder₂: $$20{,}000 \times 1 = 20{,}000$$
> * **Total: 50,000** (less than target)

#### 3.1.8 Total TVL Points per Account (Epoch)

An account's total TVL points across all pools:

$$P\_{i,\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_{p} P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$

#### 3.1.9 AMM LP Position Tracking (Uniswap V3)

Tapir Protocol uses Uniswap V3-style concentrated-liquidity AMMs. LP positions are represented as ERC-721 NFTs managed by the `NonfungiblePositionManager`. The accounting index reconstructs ownership from NFT transfer events and reads each eligible position's liquidity and tick range.

**Position Enumeration:**

For directly owned positions, the owner at each point in time receives the attributable principal and fee growth. A custody or managed-liquidity contract's positions are attributed to the custody contract itself as the account of record. Its underlying users receive no attribution unless the pool configuration names an approved adapter that deterministically maps position ownership through to them.

**Token Amount Calculation:**

For each LP position, the underlying DP and YB token amounts are calculated using the Uniswap V3 liquidity math:

First clamp the current square-root price to the position range:

$$\sqrt{P^\*} = \min\left(\sqrt{P\_{\text{upper}}}, \max\left(\sqrt{P\_{\text{lower}}}, \sqrt{P\_{\text{current}}}\right)\right)$$

Then calculate principal amounts:

$$\text{amount0} = \text{liquidity} \times \frac{\sqrt{P\_{\text{upper}}} - \sqrt{P^*}}{\sqrt{P^*} \times \sqrt{P\_{\text{upper}}}}$$

$$\text{amount1} = \text{liquidity} \times (\sqrt{P^\*} - \sqrt{P\_{\text{lower}}})$$

where:

* $$\text{liquidity}$$ = Position's liquidity value from the NFT
* $$P\_{\text{current}}$$ = Current pool price from `slot0`
* $$P\_{\text{lower}}, P\_{\text{upper}}$$ = Position's price range boundaries (derived from tick range)

The index normalizes token decimals, then maps `amount0` and `amount1` to DP and YB from the pool's actual `token0` and `token1` addresses. It must not assume a fixed DP/YB order.

**Aggregation:**

The total DP and YB balances for account $$i$$ include both:

1. **Wallet holdings:** Direct token balances from `balanceOf()` on DP/YB contracts
2. **LP positions:** Sum of calculated token amounts across all LP NFTs

$$H\_{i,p}(\tau) = \text{DP}*{i,p}^{\text{wallet}}(\tau) + \text{YB}*{i,p}^{\text{wallet}}(\tau) + \sum\_{n \in \text{NFTs}*i(\tau)} \left(\text{DP}*{i,p,n}^{\text{LP}}(\tau) + \text{YB}\_{i,p,n}^{\text{LP}}(\tau)\right)$$

$$\overline{H}*{i,p}(d) = \min*{\tau \in d} H\_{i,p}(\tau)$$

**Implementation Notes:**

* The index evaluates state at the day boundary and after each balance-, ownership-, liquidity-, or price-changing transaction needed to establish the daily minimum. Atomic movement between containers under the same attributed owner preserves economic continuity.
* Unclaimed fees are not counted as TVL principal.
* A position outside the current price range still counts as principal on the side produced by the clamped-price formulas.
* AMM pool balances and position-manager custody balances are excluded from direct-wallet aggregation to prevent the same principal being counted twice.

#### 3.1.10 Aggregate TVL Points (Epoch)

Total TVL points across all accounts and all pools:

$$P\_{\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_{p} P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$

***

### 3.2 AMM Liquidity Points

AMM points reward liquidity providers based on fees earned. Each Depeg Pool $$p$$ has an associated AMM for trading its DP/YB pair, with its own multiplier and point target.

#### 3.2.1 Fee-Based Calculation Rationale

Using fees earned rather than nominal liquidity makes the raw metric sensitive to where liquidity is placed and whether it is used:

* Wide, unused ranges earn fewer points than active ranges
* Rewards LPs who provide liquidity at actively traded price ranges
* Measures realized trading activity rather than a momentary liquidity snapshot
* Attributes rewards over the exact period in which an account owns an active position

Fee-based accounting does not make wash trading unprofitable by itself. If one dollar of fees creates $$\beta P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ of expected point value and an LP recaptures share $$s$$ of the fee, self-dealing is profitable when:

$$s > \frac{1}{1 + \beta P\_{\text{TPR}}}$$

For example, an unbounded pool running at a subsidy ratio of $$k = 1.83$$ has a threshold of approximately 35.3% of its eligible fee flow. Where a position is in range for the full manipulated volume, that share equals its share of active liquidity. This is material in a young or concentrated pool.

This threshold is an identity, not a tunable parameter. Writing $$k = \beta\_p(e) \cdot P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ for the subsidy ratio, the USD of TPR paid per USD of fee rewarded, the same quantity is the ratio of the channel's incentive APR to the fee yield the pool produces on its own:

$$k = \beta\_p(e) \cdot P\_{\text{TPR}} = \frac{\text{APR}*{\text{AMM}}}{r*{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365}$$

The breakeven recapture share $$s = 1/(1+k)$$ therefore falls as soon as the AMM incentive APR is set above the pool's natural fee APR. No filter can restore it, because the rewarded party controls the metric: once fee growth is subsidized above the fee itself, fees stop being an exogenous measure of useful liquidity and become an output the LP can manufacture.

**Subsidy-ratio bound.** For this reason $$\beta\_p(e)$$ is bounded so that the program never pays more in points than the fee it rewards:

$$\beta\_p(e) \cdot P\_{\text{TPR}} \leq 1$$

Equivalently, a pool's AMM incentive rate may not exceed the rate its own fee yield supports, $$r\_{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365$$. The bound holds breakeven recapture at or above 50%, so self-dealing requires majority control of the pool's eligible fee flow rather than a minority share. Raising a pool's AMM incentive APR therefore requires raising its fee tier or its realized turnover, not its multiplier. The numeric ceiling $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ follows from the unpublished reference price. Neither the price nor the ceiling's numeric value is published, here or in any pool configuration.

**Documented exception.** A pool may operate above the bound only under a published exception approved by governance before accrual begins. The exception must state that $$k$$ exceeds 1 and that the breakeven recapture share therefore sits below 50%, **without publishing either number**, since $$k$$ beside a published $$\beta$$ recovers the reference price. The exact values are not published. The exception must also set a per-owner channel cap $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$ and the external-volume cap in Section 4.6.2 as mandatory rather than optional, name an expiry no later than the pool's maturity, and state the maximum points exposed, being $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$ applied to the channel's authorized targets over the exception period. An exception does not carry over to another pool or to a renewal, and automatic $$\beta$$ increases are disabled for its duration. The exception exists so that a pool whose fee schedule is set by an external mechanism can still run a meaningful AMM channel; it is not a way to opt out of the bound.

Per-pool scaling limits the program's maximum current-epoch payout, but it does not by itself remove the attack's profitability. Only eligible fee growth under Section 3.2.2 receives points, and the concentration, per-owner, and self-dealing controls in Section 4.6.2 are required before AMM points can be finalized.

#### 3.2.2 Raw AMM Points per Account per Pool (Epoch)

For account $$i$$ providing liquidity in pool $$p$$'s AMM during epoch $$e$$:

$$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \beta\_p(e) \cdot F\_{i,p}(e)$$

**Variable Definitions:**

| Variable                                | Description                                                                   |
| --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$ | Raw AMM points for account $$i$$ from pool $$p$$                              |
| $$\beta\_p(e)$$                         | AMM fee point multiplier for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ (adjusts dynamically)  |
| $$F\_{i,p}(e)$$                         | Eligible LP fee growth attributed to account $$i$$ during epoch $$e$$, in USD |

$$F\_{i,p}(e) = \sum\_{d \in e} F\_{i,p}(d)$$

For each ownership and liquidity segment, the accounting index derives fee accrual from Uniswap V3 fee growth inside the position's tick range:

$$\Delta f\_{j,n} = L\_n \cdot \frac{g\_{j,n}^{\text{inside}}(\tau\_1) - g\_{j,n}^{\text{inside}}(\tau\_0)}{2^{128}}, \qquad j \in {0,1}$$

where $$L\_n$$ is constant position liquidity during the segment and $$g\_{j,n}^{\text{inside}}$$ is fee growth inside for token $$j$$. Liquidity changes, NFT transfers, and epoch boundaries close one segment and start another. Collection timing does not affect accrual. Protocol fees are excluded.

Each token's eligible fee amount is converted to USD in UTC daily buckets using the valuation method fixed in the pool configuration. While both DP and YB remain claims on one Pool Asset unit for incentive valuation, each fee token uses $$q\_p(d)$$. If a resolved depeg changes those claims, AMM point finalization pauses unless the pool configuration already defines separate DP and YB valuation sources.

The position owner during a segment receives its eligible fees. Managed or custody positions use the same approved ownership adapter as TVL accounting. Fees attributable to a directly or beneficially self-dealing swap are ineligible under Section 4.6.2.

**Example:**

> LP earns $500 in fees from pool $$p$$'s AMM during an epoch. With an authorized $$\beta\_p = 50$$:
>
> $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = 50 \times 500 = 25{,}000 \text{ raw points}$$
>
> Whether 50 is available to a given pool depends on the subsidy-ratio bound at the unpublished reference price.

#### 3.2.3 Raw AMM Points per Pool (Epoch)

Total raw AMM points across all LPs for pool $$p$$:

$$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$

#### 3.2.4 Pool-Level Scaling Factor (AMM)

If a pool's raw points exceed its target, a scaling factor is applied to cap total points at the target. If raw points are at or below target, no scaling is applied.

$$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \min\left(1, \frac{P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)}{\sum\_i \hat{P}\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)}\right)$$

The denominator sums the account amounts surviving the external-volume and per-owner caps of Section 4.6, not raw points. Where neither cap binds the two are equal.

If that post-cap total is zero, $$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$ is defined as 1 and final AMM points are zero. The guard tests the denominator actually used, not raw points, because the caps can reduce a positive raw total to zero.

#### 3.2.5 Final AMM Points per Account per Pool (Epoch)

Apply the scaling factor to the account's amount **after** the external-volume and per-owner caps of Section 4.6, written $$\hat{P}\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$:

$$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) \cdot \hat{P}\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$

Where neither cap binds, $$\hat{P}$$ equals the raw amount and this reduces to scaling raw points. Where a cap binds, scaling the raw amount instead **understates** an honest participant's result: in the concentration worked case carried by the Zircuit pool configuration it returns about 464 points rather than the correct 3,215.

#### 3.2.6 Final AMM Points per Pool (Epoch)

Total final AMM points across all LPs for pool $$p$$:

$$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$

**Note:** Due to scaling, $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) \leq P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ always holds before account-level rounding.

**Example: Overshoot (Scaling Applied)**

This example shows the scaling step alone. A real AMM channel applies the external-volume and per-owner caps of Section 4.6 first, and $$\kappa$$ is then computed from the amounts that survive them, so the figures below are the scaling arithmetic rather than a finalized payout.

> Pool $$p$$ has $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) = 50{,}000$$ points.
>
> Three LPs earn fees resulting in raw points of 40,000, 30,000, and 30,000:
>
> * Total raw: $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}} = 100{,}000$$ points (overshoot)
>
> Scaling factor: $$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}} = \frac{50{,}000}{100{,}000} = 0.5$$
>
> **Final points (scaled):**
>
> * LP₁: $$40{,}000 \times 0.5 = 20{,}000$$
> * LP₂: $$30{,}000 \times 0.5 = 15{,}000$$
> * LP₃: $$30{,}000 \times 0.5 = 15{,}000$$
> * **Total: 50,000** (equals target)

**Example: Undershoot (No Scaling)**

> Pool $$p$$ has $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) = 100{,}000$$ points.
>
> Two LPs earn fees resulting in raw points of 25,000 and 15,000:
>
> * Total raw: $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}} = 40{,}000$$ points (undershoot)
>
> Scaling factor: $$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}} = 1$$ (no scaling)
>
> **Final points (unchanged):**
>
> * LP₁: $$25{,}000 \times 1 = 25{,}000$$
> * LP₂: $$15{,}000 \times 1 = 15{,}000$$
> * **Total: 40,000** (less than target)

#### 3.2.7 Total AMM Points per Account (Epoch)

An account's total AMM points across all pools:

$$P\_{i,\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_{p} P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$

#### 3.2.8 Aggregate AMM Points (Epoch)

Total AMM points across all accounts and all pools:

$$P\_{\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_{i,\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_{p} P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$

***

### 3.3 Combined Point Totals

#### 3.3.1 Total Points per Account (Epoch)

The total points earned by account $$i$$ during epoch $$e$$:

$$P\_i(e) = P\_{i,\text{TVL}}(e) + P\_{i,\text{AMM}}(e)$$

An account can earn points from both TVL holdings and AMM liquidity provision simultaneously.

#### 3.3.2 Aggregate Points (Epoch)

The total points across all accounts for epoch $$e$$:

$$P(e) = \sum\_{i} P\_i(e) = P\_{\text{TVL}}(e) + P\_{\text{AMM}}(e)$$

#### 3.3.3 Cumulative Points per Account

The cumulative points earned by account $$i$$ from program start through epoch $$E$$:

$$P\_i^{\text{cumulative}}(E) = \sum\_{e=1}^{E} P\_i(e)$$

This cumulative total records the account's finalized points and corresponding TPR allocation at the fixed 1:1 ratio. It is not the account's currently withdrawable balance: Section 5 determines which daily lots have unlocked and subtracts tokens already withdrawn. Points cannot be transferred or traded.

***

## 4. Token Entitlement and Control Mechanism

This section describes how finalized points create TPR entitlements and how multipliers adjust toward point targets.

***

### 4.1 Point-to-TPR Conversion

Points convert to TPR at a fixed 1:1 ratio:

$$1 \text{ point} = 1 \text{ TPR}$$

After scaling, budget validation, finalization, and rounding, each final point automatically establishes one TPR of entitlement. This is an accounting allocation, not a transfer of spendable tokens to the user:

$$T\_i(e) = P\_i(e)$$

***

### 4.2 Per-Pool Point Targets

Each Depeg Pool $$p$$ has separate point targets for TVL and AMM activities per epoch. These targets control:

1. **Scaling:** Points are capped at the target when overshooting (Section 3)
2. **Multiplier adjustment:** Multipliers adjust based on over/undershoot (Section 4.3)

#### 4.2.1 Target Structure

| Component        | Symbol                                   | Description                                                |
| ---------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| TVL Point Target | $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Authorized TVL point ceiling for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ |
| AMM Point Target | $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Authorized AMM point ceiling for pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$ |

**Example Pool Targets:**

| Pool      | TVL Target (points/epoch) | AMM Target (points/epoch) | Total       |
| --------- | ------------------------- | ------------------------- | ----------- |
| Pool A    | 100,000                   | 50,000                    | 150,000     |
| Pool B    | 80,000                    | 40,000                    | 120,000     |
| Pool C    | 60,000                    | 30,000                    | 90,000      |
| **Total** | **240,000**               | **120,000**               | **360,000** |

Since one finalized point creates a one-TPR entitlement, these ceilings can create at most 360,000 TPR of entitlement in the epoch before account-level rounding.

#### 4.2.2 Finalized Epoch Points

The total TPR entitlement finalized in an epoch equals total final points across all pools:

$$P(e) = \sum\_{p} \bigl(P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) + P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e)\bigr)$$

Due to asymmetric scaling and account-level rounding:

* **Undershooting pools:** Finalize less than the target
* **Overshooting pools:** Finalize no more than the target

Unused capacity in one pool or channel does not move to another pool or channel during the same epoch. It remains in the program budget and may be authorized prospectively.

#### 4.2.3 Program-Level Budget Cap

The routine point program has a hard cumulative cap:

$$B\_{\text{program}} = 120{,}000{,}000$$

At any time $$t$$, the budget state must satisfy:

$$B\_{\text{free}}(t) = B\_{\text{program}} - B\_{\text{spent}}(t) - B\_{\text{committed}}(t) \geq 0$$

Before epoch $$e$$ begins, the sum of its authorized channel targets must not exceed the free budget:

$$C(e) = \sum\_p \left(P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) + P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)\right) \leq B\_{\text{free}}(t\_{\text{authorize}})$$

Authorization moves $$C(e)$$ from free budget to committed budget. This reserves capacity even if an earlier ledger is still inside its challenge window. Targets that fail the check are not valid and must be reduced before the affected accrual period begins.

The cumulative cap bounds total issuance but not its rate, so a published **program rolling cap** additionally limits authorized targets across all pools in any four consecutive epochs. A per-pool ceiling in one pool's configuration does not satisfy this, because it cannot bind another pool.

Authorizations are recorded in a single serialized register with a monotonic sequence number, and $$B\_{\text{free}}$$ is evaluated at the point of record rather than at the point of request. Program budget state, including each pool's committed ceiling and the current free balance, is maintained in the allocation ledger named in the program configuration. Without serialization two pools can read the same free balance and each authorize against it, committing more than the budget holds while both checks appear to pass.

At finalization, the commitment $$C(e)$$ is removed, $$P(e)$$ is added to spent budget, and $$C(e)-P(e)$$ returns to free budget:

$$0 \leq P(e) \leq C(e)$$

This commitment accounting preserves the fixed 1:1 conversion. There is no end-of-program proportional haircut. Underspend and rounding residuals return to $$B\_{\text{free}}$$. The separate 30,000,000 TPR reserve cannot backfill routine point targets unless governance creates and publishes a distinct incentive program for that reserve.

***

### 4.3 Multiplier Adjustment Mechanism

Each pool has its own multipliers ($$\alpha\_p$$ for TVL, $$\beta\_p$$ for AMM) that adjust dynamically based on whether the previous epoch overshot or undershot its point target.

#### 4.3.1 TVL Multiplier Adjustment

After an eligible epoch is finalized, the TVL multiplier for pool $$p$$ adjusts within its bounds:

$$\alpha\_p(e+1) = \operatorname{clamp}\left(\alpha\_p(e) \cdot \left(\frac{P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)}{P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)}\right)^{\gamma},\ \alpha\_{\min},\ \alpha\_{\max}\right)$$

**Note:** The adjustment uses **raw points** (before scaling) to properly detect overshoot.

**Adjustment Behavior:**

| Condition                                                | Ratio         | Effect                                                        |
| -------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Undershoot ($$P^{\text{raw}} < P^{\text{target}}$$)      | $$> 1$$       | Multiplier increases (more points per dollar, attracting TVL) |
| On target ($$P^{\text{raw}} \approx P^{\text{target}}$$) | $$\approx 1$$ | Multiplier unchanged                                          |
| Overshoot ($$P^{\text{raw}} > P^{\text{target}}$$)       | $$< 1$$       | Multiplier decreases (fewer points per dollar)                |

#### 4.3.2 AMM Multiplier Adjustment

After an eligible epoch is finalized, the AMM multiplier for pool $$p$$ adjusts within its bounds:

$$\beta\_p(e+1) = \operatorname{clamp}\left(\beta\_p(e) \cdot \left(\frac{P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)}{P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)}\right)^{\gamma},\ \beta\_{\min},\ \beta\_{\max}\right)$$

The same adjustment logic applies as TVL.

#### 4.3.3 Observation and Data Guards

The automatic feedback formula runs only if all of the following are true for that channel:

* the epoch is not designated a launch epoch for that pool under Section 4.5.2;
* its epoch target is greater than zero;
* its raw observation is at or above the pool's published observation floor, which is expressed as a share of that channel's epoch target and defaults to 25%;
* the source dataset is complete and the epoch ledger is finalized; and
* no AMM self-dealing or concentration hold under Section 4.6.2 applies.

An automatic **increase** to $$\beta\_p$$ additionally requires that the epoch's eligible fee growth be attributable to externally sourced volume, meaning swaps whose sender and beneficiary hold no attributed liquidity position in the same pool. Self-sourced fee growth may reduce $$\beta\_p$$ but may never raise it.

If a target or raw observation is zero, the observation is below its floor, data is incomplete, or a hold applies, the multiplier remains unchanged. Governance may set a new multiplier prospectively after documenting the reason. This avoids division by zero and stops a starved channel from ratcheting its multiplier toward the upper bound. An absolute floor would not: a channel sitting just above a fixed point count reads as a deep undershoot every epoch and compounds the same increase indefinitely. A floor set as a share of target holds the multiplier instead, leaving the re-pricing decision with governance.

Because the challenge window can run past the next epoch boundary, an epoch's ledger may finalize only after the following epoch has begun. The adjustment computed from a finalized epoch therefore takes effect in the first epoch that begins after finalization. Epochs that began earlier keep the multiplier they started with, per the freeze rule in Section 2.3, and the observation is not reapplied to them. Throughout Section 4.3, $$e+1$$ denotes that first epoch to begin after epoch $$e$$'s finalization.

The base of the adjustment is $$\alpha\_p(e)$$, the multiplier the **source** epoch actually ran under, never the current live multiplier.

Where several finalized epochs are queued at one boundary, **only the adjustment from the latest source epoch is applied** and the earlier ones are discarded as superseded. Applying them in sequence instead would compound: because the change band in Section 4.3.4 is enforced against the live multiplier, two queued adjustments each carrying the same candidate value would move the live multiplier twice, so a band of $$\times 1.4$$ would permit $$\times 1.96$$ across one boundary. Discarding superseded adjustments keeps one application per boundary and the band binding.

#### 4.3.4 Dampening Factor

The dampening factor $$\gamma$$ controls how aggressively multipliers adjust:

$$\gamma = 0.5 \quad \text{(default)}$$

* Lower $$\gamma$$ → smoother, more gradual adjustments
* Higher $$\gamma$$ → faster response to over/undershoot

**Stability condition.** The loop is only trivially stable when TVL is held constant, which is the case the multiplier exists to prevent. Let $$\varepsilon$$ be the elasticity of participating capital to the advertised rate, so that an epoch's participation responds to the previous epoch's multiplier as $$V\_e \propto \alpha\_p(e-1)^{\varepsilon}$$. In log deviations from equilibrium the closed loop is $$a\_{e+1} = (1-\gamma) a\_e - \gamma \varepsilon a\_{e-1}$$, with characteristic polynomial $$z^2 - (1-\gamma) z + \gamma\varepsilon$$. The response is oscillatory above $$\varepsilon = (1-\gamma)^2 / 4\gamma$$ and divergent above

$$\varepsilon > 1/\gamma$$

which is $$\varepsilon > 2$$ at $$\gamma = 0.5$$. Additional finalization lag lowers both boundaries. Incentive-seeking capital can exceed that elasticity, so $$\gamma$$ must be set against an estimate of $$\varepsilon$$ for the pool rather than from the qualitative table in Section 7.3.1, and the bound below applies regardless.

**Per-epoch change band.** Independently of $$\gamma$$, a single adjustment may not move a multiplier outside

$$0.7 \cdot m\_p^{\text{live}} \leq m\_p(e+1) \leq 1.4 \cdot m\_p^{\text{live}}, \qquad m \in {\alpha, \beta}$$

where $$m\_p^{\text{live}}$$ is the multiplier **in effect at the moment the adjustment takes effect**, not the source epoch's multiplier. The candidate value is still computed from the source epoch's multiplier per Section 4.3.1, but the band is enforced against the live value. Enforcing it against the source instead would let two adjustments computed from the same source epoch but different observations move the live multiplier by more than the band allows: from a source of 0.02, a four-fold overshoot yields a banded 0.014 and a four-fold undershoot a banded 0.028, so applying them in sequence moves the live multiplier by a factor of 2.0 while each individually appears to respect a 1.4 limit.

The band is applied before the bounds in Section 4.3.5 and the rate ceiling in Section 4.3.6. It caps the amplitude of any one response. It does not by itself make the loop convergent: where $$\gamma\varepsilon > 1$$ the deviation still grows and the band only limits how fast it does so. Convergence requires $$\gamma$$ set against an estimate of $$\varepsilon$$.

#### 4.3.5 Multiplier Bounds

Multipliers are bounded to constrain their possible values:

$$\alpha\_{\min} \leq \alpha\_p(e) \leq \alpha\_{\max}$$

$$\beta\_{\min} \leq \beta\_p(e) \leq \beta\_{\max}$$

| Parameter          | Value                                                                                         |
| ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| $$\alpha\_{\min}$$ | 0.01                                                                                          |
| $$\alpha\_{\max}$$ | 1.0                                                                                           |
| $$\beta\_{\min}$$  | 1.0                                                                                           |
| $$\beta\_{\max}$$  | $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$, replaced by an approved exception's published ceiling for its duration |

$$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ must be a positive accounting input. Because $$\beta\_{\max}$$ is inversely proportional to it, a reference price above 1 would put the upper bound below $$\beta\_{\min}$$, and a rate ceiling can likewise fall below a minimum multiplier. The bounds, the rate ceiling and any approved exception ceiling are therefore applied as an **intersection**, and a configuration whose intersection is empty is rejected rather than resolved in favour of whichever constraint was applied last.

#### 4.3.6 Incentive Rate Ceiling and Wind-Down

The bounds above are absolute guardrails, not operating limits. They bound the multiplier but not the rate it implies, so a pool whose delivered TVL falls far below its target would otherwise have its multiplier driven upward until the two met, at an implied rate with no ceiling.

Each pool publishes a maximum incentive rate per channel, $$R\_{\max,p}$$, stated in points per US dollar of capital per year rather than as an APR, since an APR beside its multiplier recovers the reference price. Every adjusted or governance-set multiplier is clamped to it, using the conversions in Section 7.3.2:

$$\alpha\_p(e) \leq \frac{R\_{\max,p}}{365}, \qquad \beta\_p(e) \leq \min\left(\frac{1}{P\_{\text{TPR}}},\ \frac{R\_{\max,p}}{r\_{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365}\right)$$

Where a pool operates under an approved subsidy-ratio exception under Section 3.2.1, the $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ term above is replaced by that exception's published ceiling for its duration. The $$R\_{\max,p}$$ term continues to apply unchanged, as does the prohibition on automatic $$\beta$$ increases.

The clamp is applied after the per-epoch change band and inside the bounds. A pool that cannot attract its target at the ceiling is not re-priced above it.

**Wind-down.** If a channel's raw points remain below its observation floor for four consecutive eligible epochs, its multiplier is frozen and its authorized targets for epochs that have **not yet begun** are de-authorized under Section 4.2.3, returning that committed budget to $$B\_{\text{free}}$$. An epoch already under way keeps its authorized target and its commitment, per the freeze rule in Section 2.3. Re-authorization requires a published governance decision. Both the four-epoch count and $$R\_{\max,p}$$ are pool configuration fields.

#### 4.3.7 Independent Adjustment Example

> Pool $$p$$ in epoch $$e$$:
>
> * TVL raw points: 800,000 (target: 1,000,000) → **undershoot**
> * AMM raw points: 600,000 (target: 500,000) → **overshoot**
>
> With $$\gamma = 0.5$$, $$\alpha\_p(e) = 0.02$$, $$\beta\_p(e) = 30.0$$:
>
> TVL multiplier adjustment: $$\alpha\_p(e+1) = 0.02 \times \left(\frac{1{,}000{,}000}{800{,}000}\right)^{0.5} = 0.02 \times 1.118 = 0.0224$$
>
> AMM multiplier adjustment: $$\beta\_p(e+1) = 30.0 \times \left(\frac{500{,}000}{600{,}000}\right)^{0.5} = 30.0 \times 0.913 = 27.4$$
>
> Both observations clear the 25% observation floor, and both moves sit inside the per-epoch band of $$\times 0.7$$ to $$\times 1.4$$. Each result is then clamped to the pool's published rate ceiling under Section 4.3.6, which may reduce it further.
>
> In epoch $$e+1$$: TVL earns more points per dollar (attracting deposits), AMM earns fewer points per dollar of fees.

***

### 4.4 Program-Level Issuance Planning

Program-level issuance planning across pools is internal and is not published. It is not a point-earning commitment, a token unlock, or a release schedule. Only pre-authorized per-pool epoch targets and finalized activity create points.

**Notes:**

* Each pool publishes its own per-epoch target schedule in its configuration, for example the [Zircuit USDC pool's schedule](https://docs.tapir.money/pages/LEA2cN6Bs0Zb3FKrATI9#id-7.-target-schedule-through-maturity)
* Reserve (30,000,000 TPR) remains separate for future initiatives
* Actual point finalization may run below targets because targets are ceilings

***

### 4.5 Translating Planning Budgets to Per-Pool Epoch Targets

This section provides guidance for setting per-pool, per-epoch point targets from a planning budget and pool projections. Calendar-month plans must first be mapped to the exact epochs they authorize.

#### 4.5.1 Planning Framework

To set epoch targets for a new pool, governance should:

1. **Define TVL growth trajectory:** Set target TVL for each epoch based on growth assumptions
2. **Choose the target basis:** Use end-of-epoch TVL for a launch epoch and the midpoint of start and end for a steady epoch, per Section 4.5.2
3. **Calculate point targets:** Apply multipliers to the basis TVL selected in step 2
4. **Set TVL and AMM ceilings:** Use the pool configuration's expected AMM participation and activity assumptions. The planning range is 20% to 40% of pool TVL in the AMM unless the pool configuration supports another input

#### 4.5.2 Target Basis and Growth Model

A pool's **launch epochs** are those before its TVL plan reaches a steady level. Their targets use **end-of-epoch** TVL, and they are excluded from multiplier feedback under Section 4.3.3. Incentive capital arrives early in an epoch rather than evenly across it, so an average-based ceiling would scale the earliest participants down through $$\kappa$$ exactly when a launch succeeds, while an end-of-epoch ceiling priced off the same plan accommodates that arrival without issuing above plan. Excluding those epochs from feedback prevents the same conservative ceiling from reading as an undershoot and raising the multiplier. The pool configuration names which epochs are launch epochs.

For **steady epochs**, where TVL is expected to grow modestly within the epoch, use **average daily TVL**:

$$\text{Basis TVL} = \text{TVL}*{\text{end}}\ \text{(launch epoch)}, \qquad \text{Basis TVL} = \frac{\text{TVL}*{\text{start}} + \text{TVL}\_{\text{end}}}{2}\ \text{(steady epoch)}$$

Point targets are then:

$$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) = \alpha\_p(e) \times \text{Basis TVL} \times D(e)$$

$$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) = \beta\_p(e) \times \text{Expected Fees}$$

Where a pool's fee varies with remaining term, evaluate it at the midpoint of each epoch's AMM-eligible window rather than applying one flat fee across the schedule.

Expected Fees = Basis AMM TVL × Daily Turnover × $$D(e)$$ × Fee Rate, where Basis TVL is end-of-epoch TVL in a launch epoch and average daily TVL in a steady epoch.

Because a target is a ceiling rather than a promised payout, any advertised incentive rate, stated in points per US dollar of capital per year, must be published together with its sensitivity to $$\kappa$$: the realized rate is the advertised rate multiplied by the channel's scaling factor for that epoch, and it is not known until the epoch is finalized.

#### 4.5.3 Worked Example: First Four Epochs

**Scenario:** Launch a new pool targeting $5M TVL by the end of its first four 7-day epochs, with 30% AMM participation. All four are launch epochs, so targets use end-of-epoch TVL and none of them feeds multiplier adjustment. $$\beta\_p$$ is taken as 50 purely to keep the arithmetic legible. A real pool's value is solved from its own target rate and is then bound by $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ at the unpublished reference price, so 50 is available only where that price allows it.

**Assumptions:**

| Parameter                                  | Value      |
| ------------------------------------------ | ---------- |
| Target end-of-period TVL                   | $5,000,000 |
| AMM as % of TVL                            | 30%        |
| Daily turnover (volume/AMM TVL)            | 10%        |
| AMM fee tier                               | 0.3%       |
| Initial TVL multiplier ($$\alpha\_p$$)     | 0.02       |
| Illustrative AMM multiplier ($$\beta\_p$$) | 50         |

**TVL Target Calculation:**

| Epoch | Start TVL  | End TVL    | Basis TVL  | Point Target                |
| ----- | ---------- | ---------- | ---------- | --------------------------- |
| 1     | $0         | $1,250,000 | $1,250,000 | 0.02 × $1.25M × 7 = 175,000 |
| 2     | $1,250,000 | $2,500,000 | $2,500,000 | 0.02 × $2.5M × 7 = 350,000  |
| 3     | $2,500,000 | $3,750,000 | $3,750,000 | 0.02 × $3.75M × 7 = 525,000 |
| 4     | $3,750,000 | $5,000,000 | $5,000,000 | 0.02 × $5M × 7 = 700,000    |

**AMM Target Calculation:**

| Epoch | Basis AMM TVL (30%) | Expected Weekly Fees                 | Point Target             |
| ----- | ------------------- | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------ |
| 1     | $375,000            | $375K × 10% × 7 × 0.3% = $787.50     | 50 × $787.50 = 39,375    |
| 2     | $750,000            | $750K × 10% × 7 × 0.3% = $1,575.00   | 50 × $1,575.00 = 78,750  |
| 3     | $1,125,000          | $1.125M × 10% × 7 × 0.3% = $2,362.50 | 50 × $2,362.50 = 118,125 |
| 4     | $1,500,000          | $1.5M × 10% × 7 × 0.3% = $3,150.00   | 50 × $3,150.00 = 157,500 |

**Four-Epoch Summary:**

Every AMM result here is a whole number, so no rounding convention is needed for this example. A real schedule usually produces fractional results, which are authorized per epoch as integers; state in that case whether a total sums the exact values or the rounded ones.

| Component  | Total Points  |
| ---------- | ------------- |
| TVL Points | 1,750,000     |
| AMM Points | 393,750       |
| **Total**  | **2,143,750** |

#### 4.5.4 Multi-Pool Allocation

When running multiple pools simultaneously, governance should:

1. **Set epoch budget:** Total points authorized for the exact epochs, within Section 4.2.3
2. **Allocate across pools:** Weight by strategic importance, TVL targets, or asset risk profile
3. **Calculate per-pool targets:** Apply the methodology above to each pool
4. **Publish the cost basis:** Every pool authorization states its point issuance per TVL-year and its expected protocol fee per TVL-year, reported side by side, so that governance authorizes a spend against the revenue it is expected to support rather than against a point count alone. The two are not divided into a single ratio, because dividing a point count by a dollar amount states a TPR price by implication

**Example:** Four-epoch budget of 10M points across three pools:

| Pool   | Weight | Four-Epoch Allocation | Epochs | Per-Epoch Target    |
| ------ | ------ | --------------------- | ------ | ------------------- |
| Pool A | 50%    | 5,000,000 points      | 4      | \~1,250,000 average |
| Pool B | 30%    | 3,000,000 points      | 4      | \~750,000 average   |
| Pool C | 20%    | 2,000,000 points      | 4      | \~500,000 average   |

Note: Per-epoch targets will vary based on TVL growth trajectory (ramping up as TVL grows).

***

### 4.6 Anti-Gaming Mechanisms

The following controls reduce manipulation and bound program losses. They do not make Sybil behavior or beneficial ownership fully observable on-chain.

Two limits are economic rather than detective: the subsidy-ratio bound in Section 3.2.1, which keeps points paid below the fee rewarded, and the per-owner and external-volume caps in Section 4.6.2. Their reach differs and should not be overstated. The per-owner cap bounds what **one attributed owner** receives; it does not bound a group of separately attributed owners acting together. The external-volume cap bounds a channel by the fee growth it can source externally, but an unlinked address that holds no attributed position in the pool counts as external. Against an undisclosed group, therefore, the binding limit is the channel's authorized target, not either cap.

**Order of application.** A channel's points are resolved in the following order, each step operating on the output of the previous one. The sequence is account-level throughout, so that every step determines individual payouts rather than only a channel total.

1. **Raw points per account** under Section 3, computed from eligible fee growth only. Fees already ineligible under Section 3.2.2, including identified self-dealing and configured cyclic trades, are excluded at source and never enter the total.
2. **External-volume ceiling.** Let $$F^{\text{ext}}\_p(e)$$ be the epoch's fee growth attributable to externally sourced volume. If the channel's raw total exceeds $$\beta\_p(e) \cdot F^{\text{ext}}\_p(e)$$, every account's raw points are multiplied by the ratio of that ceiling to the raw total. Scaling every account by a common factor is what makes this step deterministic at the account level: the ceiling bounds activity that has not been attributed to any particular owner, so it cannot be charged to specific accounts.
3. **Per-owner cap.** Each attributed owner's result is capped at $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$ of the channel's authorized target. Points removed here are not redistributed to other accounts. What returns to the program budget is the authorized target less the finalized payout, so a capped epoch that still fills its target returns nothing.
4. **Channel scaling factor** $$\kappa$$, computed against the authorized target from the totals surviving steps 2 and 3, then applied to each account.
5. **Program-budget check** under Section 4.2.3.

Steps 2 and 3 answer different questions and neither substitutes for the other: the external-volume ceiling bounds a channel by activity it can source from outside itself, while the per-owner cap bounds what any one identified owner takes from it. An owner's final points are therefore the lesser of what the two produce. Step 1 takes raw points from Sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2. The per-channel scaling formulas in Sections 3.1.6 and 3.2.5 describe step 4 only, and their output is not the finalized result where either cap in steps 2 or 3 binds; finalized daily lots under Section 5.2 are allocated from the output of step 5. Sybil splitting does not by itself increase TVL points, since $$\alpha\_p \cdot \overline{H} \cdot q$$ is linear in principal and $$\kappa$$ applies at pool level; splitting matters only where it defeats a per-owner cap, a concentration gate, or a self-dealing filter.

#### 4.6.1 TVL-Specific Protections

| Mechanism                | Description                                                                                                                                          |
| ------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Full-Day Minimum**     | The minimum continuously owned principal, aggregated across wallet and attributable LP positions, removes the benefit of momentary balance inflation |
| **Ownership Continuity** | Incoming or transferred principal cannot earn for a day unless the same economic owner maintains exposure throughout it                              |
| **Forward Adjustment**   | Overshooting a target can reduce future points, but does not claw back the current epoch                                                             |

#### 4.6.2 AMM-Specific Protections

| Mechanism                          | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| ---------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Eligible-Fee Filter**            | Fees from a swap are excluded when the trader or swap beneficiary is also the direct or attributed beneficial owner of the rewarded LP position. The check uses on-chain sender and recipient data, approved ownership adapters, and controlled-address sets declared under the pool configuration                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| **Cyclic-Trade Filter**            | The pool configuration defines a lookback window and net-exposure tolerance. Fees from linked round trips are ineligible when the trading account is attributed to the same beneficial owner as the rewarded LP. Unrelated arbitrage does not make an LP's fee growth ineligible                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| **Concentration Gate**             | Each pool sets a maximum related-owner share of active liquidity. Above it, automatic $$\beta$$ increases are disabled and the next AMM target requires explicit prospective authorization                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| **Finalization Hold**              | A supported challenge that identifies undisclosed related addresses or cyclic trading pauses the affected AMM ledger until the disputed fees are included or excluded with a published reason                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| **Per-Owner Channel Cap**          | A single attributed owner may receive at most $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$ of the **AMM** channel's epoch target, default 40%. It does not apply to the TVL channel, where points are linear in principal and cannot be manufactured, so a cap there would penalize a large honest depositor without bounding any attack. The cap **reduces** the dilution an honest participant suffers from manufactured volume; it does not remove it, because the surviving total can still exceed the target and be scaled. Points above the cap are not redistributed to other accounts. Only the authorized target less the finalized payout returns to the program budget, so a channel that still fills its target returns nothing. This reduces, without removing, the haircut that pool-level scaling would otherwise impose on every other account when one account manufactures fee growth |
| **External-Volume Cap**            | A pool's AMM points in an epoch may not exceed $$\beta\_p(e)$$ applied to fee growth attributable to externally sourced volume. This bounds the channel even where related addresses are not identified                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| **Overshoot Cap (**$$\kappa$$**)** | Pool-level points are capped at the authorized target. This bounds the program's current-epoch issuance. On its own it does not make self-dealing unprofitable, and because a channel is a fixed pot, without the per-owner cap above it transfers the cost of manufactured fee growth to every honest participant in the channel rather than absorbing it                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| **Forward Adjustment**             | Overshooting can reduce $$\beta$$ for the following eligible epoch. It is a feedback control, not a current-epoch defense                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

#### 4.6.3 Universal Protections

| Mechanism                    | Description                                                                                                                                                                        |
| ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Per-Pool Independence**    | Each pool's multiplier adjusts independently                                                                                                                                       |
| **Bounded Multipliers**      | Constrains raw point sensitivity                                                                                                                                                   |
| **Dampening Factor**         | Reduces the size of multiplier changes caused by one epoch                                                                                                                         |
| **Channel and Program Caps** | Per-pool targets bound each channel, while Section 4.2.3 bounds cumulative routine issuance                                                                                        |
| **Provisional Results**      | Per-participant results shown in the app dashboard, published accounting metadata, and a challenge window allow attribution and data errors to be corrected before points finalize |

***

## 5. Point Conversion and Proposed Token Unlock Schedule

Points are non-transferable and cannot be traded. Their only use is conversion into TPR at a fixed 1:1 ratio. Each finalized point automatically establishes one TPR of entitlement; users do not need a separate transaction to claim a locked allocation.

Token unlocks will begin on an **Unlock Start Date** to be announced later, some time after the token generation event (TGE) and public sale; no fixed interval is promised. The announcement must set $$U$$ no earlier than the announcement date plus the published notice period. Without that constraint a backdated $$U$$ would make every lot whose scheduled date had already passed withdrawable on the announcement day, releasing the entire accrued backlog at once and with no notice.

Because every lot unlocks $$(U - T\_0)$$ days after it was earned, that interval is the lock length for every participant, whenever they earned. It is determined by how long the protocol takes to reach the TGE milestone rather than by any per-participant term: a later $$U$$ lengthens the lock for everyone, and an earlier one shortens it for those who join late. Tokens will unlock in the same sequence and amounts as the corresponding points were earned, measured from the start of the points program. This is not necessarily a constant-rate linear release: changes in daily point earning produce matching changes in daily token unlocks.

Tapir Protocol plans TGE and the public sale as a common launch milestone and will announce TGE and its date when protocol total value locked (TVL) reaches $10 million. That milestone triggers the planned date announcement, not immediate token unlocks. The Unlock Start Date is separate; this specification sets no calendar date or fixed interval for it.

**Subject to change:** The proposed token unlock schedule, the Unlock Start Date, and the TGE/public-sale timing and announcement milestone are subject to change.

### 5.1 Unlock Date Calculation

For each finalized daily lot $$\ell$$:

$$
\text{Unlock\_Date}*{\ell} = U + \left(\text{Point\_Earn\_Date}*{\ell} - T\_0\right)
$$

Here, $$T\_0$$ is the first eligible earning day of the global points program at 00:00 UTC, and $$U$$ is the Unlock Start Date. The difference is elapsed UTC days, not calendar-month arithmetic. Pool configurations supply operational dates; this general specification does not choose them or reset existing pool epochs.

| Point earn day               | Scheduled token unlock   |
| ---------------------------- | ------------------------ |
| First eligible day, $$T\_0$$ | Unlock Start Date, $$U$$ |
| $$T\_0 + 30$$ days           | $$U + 30$$ days          |
| $$T\_0 + 90$$ days           | $$U + 90$$ days          |

Each daily lot unlocks in full on its own scheduled date. The same rule applies to points earned after TGE or after the Unlock Start Date. No additional cliff is added to this formula, and token launch does not reset earn dates.

### 5.2 Earn Dates and Finalization

Finalization preserves the UTC date on which the qualifying contribution occurred:

* TVL points use the date of the complete UTC holding day.
* AMM points use the UTC date of the eligible fee-accrual bucket.
* Each account's finalized epoch amount, after every control in Section 4.6 has been applied, is allocated proportionally across that account's own eligible daily contributions in the pool and channel. Allocating from raw daily lots scaled by $$\kappa$$ alone would overstate the total wherever a cap bound, so the allocation base is the post-control amount. The resulting daily lots sum to the account's rounded epoch result.

Ledgers preserve earn dates, earning-day offsets from $$T\_0$$, and finalized amounts. They can finalize while the TGE and Unlock Start Date remain unannounced. The Unlock Start Date is published separately, so announcing it does not rewrite an earning ledger.

A lot is eligible for withdrawal only after both its scheduled unlock and finalization:

$$
\text{Available\_From}*{\ell} = \max\left(\text{Unlock\_Date}*{\ell},\ \text{Finalized\_At}\_{\ell}\right)
$$

Late finalization does not restart the schedule. A lot whose scheduled date has already passed becomes eligible upon finalization. Late withdrawal also does not restart the schedule: already unlocked, unwithdrawn tokens remain available. While $$U$$ is unannounced, allocations can be recorded but no point-program TPR is eligible for withdrawal.

### 5.3 Allocation and Withdrawal

The proposed distribution contract holds TPR until users withdraw eligible amounts. An allocation is recorded automatically from finalized points at 1:1. It is not a spendable wallet balance, and neither points nor allocation receipts are transferable through this program. The application can display total allocated, locked, unlocked-but-unwithdrawn, and withdrawn TPR separately.

For an account at time $$t$$, the withdrawable amount is the sum of its finalized lots with $$\text{Available\_From}\_{\ell} \le t$$, less TPR already withdrawn from those lots. Recording an allocation does not mint a tradable point token, release TPR, or consume the same point a second time.

Each finalized earning ledger records, for every account and pool, raw TVL points, raw AMM points, both scaling factors, rounded final points, and the resulting daily lots with earn dates and offsets. Each epoch's ledger is published as a hash-identified file, linked from the app's [public points feed](https://partners.app.tapir.money/api/points), and lists every participating address with its points; each participant also sees their own results in the Tapir app dashboard. Each finalized ledger's finalization timestamp and content hash and, for on-chain withdrawal proofs, the corresponding Merkle root and leaf format must be published.

The distribution implementation must:

* accept only allocations backed by a finalized ledger whose content hash has been published, and credit each finalized point exactly once;
* bind the allocation to its earning account, with no point-transfer or tradable-receipt functionality;
* retain original earn dates and release only lots whose scheduled unlock and finalization have both occurred;
* prevent withdrawals while the Unlock Start Date is unannounced and prevent duplicate withdrawals;
* transfer exactly one TPR per eligible finalized point, accounting for previous withdrawals; and
* reconcile allocations and withdrawals against the 120M routine allocation rather than the separate reserve.

Funding, withdrawal proofs, and release enforcement must be implemented and validated before withdrawals open. These are requirements for the proposed distribution mechanism, not a statement that a distribution contract or withdrawal interface is already deployed.

Finalized earning ledgers are immutable. Corrections must be resolved during the provisional challenge window. A later supplemental credit requires a separately versioned ledger, available program budget, and a published explanation. Unless a claim deadline was published before the affected accrual began, a finalized entitlement does not expire merely because it remains unwithdrawn.

***

## 6. Stakeholder Protection

The point system limits routine incentive issuance while preserving the same finalized point-to-token ratio for every participant.

### 6.1 Dilution Controls

| Mechanism               | Protection Provided                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Issuance Sequencing** | 20% of the liquidity incentives allocation (30M TPR) is held back from routine issuance and requires separate governance authorization. It defers issuance rather than reducing supply, since the tokens remain in the 1,000,000,000 total and in fully diluted valuation |
| **Program Budget Cap**  | Routine point issuance cannot exceed 120M finalized points                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| **Per-Pool Targets**    | Pre-authorized channel ceilings bound each pool's epoch issuance                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| **Overshoot Scaling**   | All accounts in an oversubscribed pool and channel receive the same proportional scaling factor                                                                                                                                                                           |
| **Fixed Conversion**    | Budget authorization occurs before accrual, so finalized points do not require a later proportional haircut                                                                                                                                                               |

### 6.2 Stakeholder Alignment Comparison

Routine point recipients follow the earning-sequence unlock schedule in Section 5. Other stakeholder cliff and vesting figures follow [Planned Tokenomics](https://docs.tapir.money/tokenomics.md#proposed-token-distribution).

The routine point row is a **ceiling, not an expectation**, and it is not comparable to the rows around it: the other allocations vest in full, while point allocations exist only to the extent points are actually earned against targets that have been authorized under Section 4.2.3, which is a separate step from approving them as policy. Finalized issuance to date is reported in Tapir's program updates, not on this page; the row shows the ceiling only. At the current pool pipeline, authorized targets total a small fraction of one percent of the routine budget, so the realistic figure is orders of magnitude below 12%.

| Stakeholder                      | Allocation                                                   | Cliff                                | Vesting                                              |
| -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------- |
| Insider pool: Pre-Seed investors | Part of the 51% insider pool, set by the final Pre-Seed size | 5 months                             | 12 months                                            |
| Insider pool: Team               | Remainder of the 51% insider pool                            | 12 months                            | 24 months                                            |
| Advisors                         | 4%                                                           | 9 months                             | 24 months                                            |
| Routine Point Recipients         | Up to 12%                                                    | Starts at separately announced $$U$$ | Daily lots unlock in their original earning sequence |
| Liquidity Incentive Reserve      | 3%                                                           | Not assigned                         | Requires separate governance authorization           |

***

## 7. Governance Parameters

The following parameters are adjustable by protocol governance:

### 7.1 Per-Pool Parameters

Each Depeg Pool has its own set of parameters:

| Parameter                             | Symbol                                   | Initial Value                                | Valid Range                                                                                                                                                 |
| ------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| TVL Multiplier                        | $$\alpha\_p(e)$$                         | Pool-specific                                | \[0.01, 1.0]                                                                                                                                                |
| AMM Fee Multiplier                    | $$\beta\_p(e)$$                          | Pool-specific                                | $$\[1.0,\ 1/P\_{\text{TPR}}]$$, or the ceiling published by an approved exception                                                                           |
| TVL Point Target                      | $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Pool-specific                                | Governance-set                                                                                                                                              |
| AMM Point Target                      | $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e)$$ | Pool-specific                                | Governance-set                                                                                                                                              |
| Activation and End Times              | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published UTC timestamps                                                                                                                                    |
| Eligible Contracts and States         | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published allowlist                                                                                                                                         |
| Pool Asset Valuation                  | $$q\_p(d)$$                              | Pool-specific                                | Published method and sources                                                                                                                                |
| Source Sampling and Aggregation       | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published method                                                                                                                                            |
| Staleness Limit                       | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published threshold                                                                                                                                         |
| Chain-Finality Policy                 | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published rule                                                                                                                                              |
| Ownership Adapter                     | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published contract and method, or direct owner where none is published                                                                                      |
| Observation Floors                    | N/A                                      | Pool-specific; 25% of channel target default | Share of target, in \[0, 1]                                                                                                                                 |
| Maximum Incentive Rate                | $$R\_{\max,p}$$                          | Pool-specific                                | Published per channel, in points per US dollar of capital per year                                                                                          |
| Launch Epochs                         | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published epoch list                                                                                                                                        |
| Per-Owner Channel Cap (AMM channel)   | $$\sigma\_{\max,p}$$                     | Pool-specific; 40% default                   | \[0, 1]                                                                                                                                                     |
| Wind-Down Epoch Count                 | N/A                                      | Pool-specific; 4 default                     | Positive integer                                                                                                                                            |
| Challenge Window                      | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published duration                                                                                                                                          |
| Cyclic-Trade Window and Tolerance     | N/A                                      | Pool-specific                                | Published duration and tolerance                                                                                                                            |
| Maximum Related-Owner Liquidity Share | $$s\_{\max,p}$$                          | Pool-specific                                | \[0, 1]. Not published where a pool defines it as the breakeven recapture share, since that value beside a published $$\beta$$ recovers the reference price |

**Note:** Every initial value in this table is set by the pool's published incentive configuration under Section 2.3; the valid ranges are the global bounds owned by Section 7.2. There is no global default multiplier and no fallback multiplier value, and a pool cannot activate under this specification until its configuration supplies every field Section 2.3 requires. Starting multipliers $$\alpha\_p(1)$$ and $$\beta\_p(1)$$ are derived from the pool's own target annual percentage rate (APR) assumptions under Section 7.3.4, within those bounds. Multiplier values appearing elsewhere in this document, including $$\alpha\_p = 0.02$$ and $$\beta\_p = 50$$ in the Section 4.5.3 worked example and $$\beta\_p = 30.0$$ in the Section 4.3.7 example, are illustrative figures chosen for legibility, not defaults, and are not tested against the subsidy-ratio bound because this document publishes no reference price. Every $$\beta\_p$$ is additionally bound by the subsidy-ratio limit in Section 3.2.1 and by the pool's own rate ceiling under Section 4.3.6. Where a pool publishes no ownership adapter, the direct owner or the custody contract is the account of record under Section 3.1.9. Multipliers adjust only after an eligible finalized epoch under Section 4.3.

### 7.2 Global Parameters

| Parameter            | Symbol                  | Initial Value                     | Valid Range                                                                                                                               |
| -------------------- | ----------------------- | --------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Dampening Factor     | $$\gamma$$              | 0.5                               | \[0.1, 1.0]                                                                                                                               |
| Min TVL Multiplier   | $$\alpha\_{\min}$$      | 0.01                              | Fixed bound                                                                                                                               |
| Max TVL Multiplier   | $$\alpha\_{\max}$$      | 1.0                               | Fixed bound                                                                                                                               |
| Min AMM Multiplier   | $$\beta\_{\min}$$       | 1.0                               | Fixed bound                                                                                                                               |
| Max AMM Multiplier   | $$\beta\_{\max}$$       | $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$             | Subsidy-ratio bound, Section 3.2.1; an approved exception publishes its own ceiling in place of this value for its duration               |
| Epoch Duration       | $$D(e)$$                | 7 days                            | \[7, 14]                                                                                                                                  |
| Program Start        | $$T\_0$$                | First eligible global earning day | Published in program configuration                                                                                                        |
| Unlock Start Date    | $$U$$                   | To be announced                   | Separate from TGE/public sale; no fixed interval; $$U \geq$$ announcement date + notice period                                            |
| Routine Point Budget | $$B\_{\text{program}}$$ | 120,000,000 points                | Hard cap                                                                                                                                  |
| Program Rolling Cap  | N/A                     | Points per rolling four epochs    | Published; binds all pools                                                                                                                |
| Unlock Notice Period | N/A                     | Published minimum                 | Applies to the announcement of $$U$$                                                                                                      |
| TPR Reference Price  | $$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$     | Unpublished planning input        | Used to solve and bound multipliers; never appears in a published document, and no figure may be published from which it can be recovered |

### 7.3 Parameter Bound Rationale

#### 7.3.1 Dampening Factor (γ = 0.5)

The dampening factor controls how aggressively multipliers adjust between epochs. The adjustment formula raises the target/actual ratio to the power $$\gamma$$, then multiplies the **source epoch's** multiplier by this result. The live multiplier is used only to enforce the per-epoch change band in Section 4.3.4, never as the base of the candidate.

| γ Value     | Behavior         | Risk                                      |
| ----------- | ---------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| 0.1–0.3     | Slow convergence | May take many epochs to reach equilibrium |
| **0.4–0.6** | **Balanced**     | **Responsive without overcorrection**     |
| 0.7–1.0     | Fast convergence | Risk of oscillation and instability       |

The behaviour column above assumes participation does not respond to the multiplier within the horizon shown. It is therefore elasticity- and lag-dependent, and the stability condition in Section 4.3.4 governs: at $$\gamma = 0.5$$ the response is oscillatory above $$\varepsilon = 0.125$$ and divergent above $$\varepsilon = 2$$, whatever this table's qualitative label.

**Selection:** $$\gamma = 0.5$$ applies the square root of the target-to-observation ratio. It reduces the size of a one-epoch response while preserving its direction. It does not by itself prevent oscillation, so the bounds and observation guards still apply.

#### 7.3.2 Multiplier Bounds and Annual Percentage Rate (APR) Relationship

Multiplier bounds place hard limits around governance and feedback changes. The relationship between multipliers and APR is:

**TVL Multiplier (α) → APR:**

$$\text{APR}*{\text{TVL}} = \alpha \times 365 \times P*{\text{TPR}}$$

where $$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ is the assumed TPR price in USD. Epoch duration changes the number of calculations, not the annualized reward rate.

These are planning sensitivities, not a fixed USD value for points or TPR, and this specification publishes no reference price. Incentive rates are published in points per US dollar of capital per year. An APR is not published anywhere, because an APR beside its multiplier recovers the price.

Earlier pool configurations that use $$7 \times 52 = 364$$ days are planning approximations. Future calculations use 365 days. Re-derive displayed rates when this changes a rounded value; the published starting multiplier remains unchanged when both methods round to the same configured value.

**AMM Multiplier (β) → APR:**

$$\text{APR}*{\text{AMM}} = \beta \times r*{\text{turnover}} \times r\_{\text{fee}} \times 365 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}$$

Here, $$r\_{\text{turnover}}$$ = daily volume / AMM TVL and $$r\_{\text{fee}}$$ = AMM fee rate.

Both relationships are linear in $$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$, so an APR figure is only meaningful alongside the reference price it was computed at, and publishing the pair recovers that price. This document states neither. Published rates use points per US dollar of capital per year, which carries no price.

#### 7.3.3 Bound Selection

The wide bounds provide governance flexibility to handle diverse market conditions:

**TVL Multiplier Bounds:**

| Bound              | Value | Implied APR                     | Rationale                                             |
| ------------------ | ----- | ------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- |
| $$\alpha\_{\min}$$ | 0.01  | $$3.65 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ | Floor for mature pools with strong organic demand     |
| $$\alpha\_{\max}$$ | 1.0   | $$365 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}$$  | Hard upper guardrail requiring explicit justification |

**AMM Multiplier Bounds:**

| Bound             | Value                 | Implied APR\*                     | Rationale                                                                          |
| ----------------- | --------------------- | --------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| $$\beta\_{\min}$$ | 1.0                   | $$0.1095 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ | Lower guardrail under the reference assumptions                                    |
| $$\beta\_{\max}$$ | $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ | **10.95%**                        | Subsidy-ratio bound: the program never pays more in points than the fee it rewards |

\*At reference assumptions of 10% daily turnover and a 0.3% fee tier. The TVL rows and the $$\beta\_{\min}$$ row scale linearly with the reference price and are therefore given as multiples of it. The $$\beta\_{\max}$$ row does not: at the subsidy-ratio bound the price cancels, leaving $$r\_{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365$$, which is exactly the pool's own natural fee APR.

**Note:** These are hard global bounds, not recommended operating values. Each pool's published maximum incentive rate under Section 4.3.6 binds before them, so the $$\alpha\_{\max}$$ row's implied rate is reachable only by a pool whose own rate ceiling is at least $$365 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}$$. Pool-specific configurations must justify their starting values and targets, and automatic adjustment remains subject to Section 4.3.3.

#### 7.3.4 Generalized Multiplier Formulas

For any target APR, whether a global bound or a pool's own starting value, the multiplier is calculated as:

**TVL Multiplier:**

$$\alpha = \frac{\text{APR}*{\text{target}}}{365 \times P*{\text{TPR}}}$$

**AMM Multiplier:**

$$\beta = \frac{\text{APR}*{\text{target}}}{r*{\text{turnover}} \times r\_{\text{fee}} \times 365 \times P\_{\text{TPR}}}$$

**Worked shape.** To solve for a target rate, substitute it and the unpublished $$P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ planning input into the two formulas above. Two cautions apply whatever the price:

Rounding the solved multiplier changes the rate it delivers, so a published rate must be derived from the multiplier actually authorized rather than from the target that produced it. Publish it in points per US dollar of capital per year, never as an APR: an APR beside its multiplier recovers the reference price.

The AMM solve must then be tested against the subsidy-ratio bound. A target AMM APR above the pool's own natural fee APR, $$r\_{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365$$, is unreachable by any multiplier: at reference turnover and fee that natural yield is 10.95%, so a 20% AMM target fails the bound regardless of the reference price. Reaching a higher AMM rate requires a higher fee tier or higher realized turnover, not a higher multiplier. LPs may also receive TVL points on eligible principal, but that separate channel is not a reason to round $$\beta$$ upward.

### 7.4 Reserve Parameters

| Parameter        | Description                 | Value                 |
| ---------------- | --------------------------- | --------------------- |
| Total Allocation | Liquidity incentives pool   | 150,000,000 TPR       |
| Distributable    | Available for point rewards | 120,000,000 TPR (80%) |
| Reserve          | Held for future initiatives | 30,000,000 TPR (20%)  |

***

## 8. Summary

The Tapir Protocol Point System distributes routine liquidity incentives through auditable, capped epoch ledgers. Its main properties are:

1. **Dual Reward Mechanism:** TVL deposits and AMM liquidity both earn points through unified per-pool formulas
2. **Per-Pool Structure:** Each Depeg Pool (DP/YB pair + AMM) has independent multipliers and point targets
3. **Fixed Conversion and Hard Budget:** Finalized points convert 1:1, per-channel scaling enforces epoch ceilings, and the cumulative routine cap is 120M points
4. **Guarded Multiplier Adjustment:** Pool multipliers ($$\alpha\_p$$, $$\beta\_p$$) respond to eligible observations, stay inside bounds, move by at most the per-epoch band, never exceed the pool's published rate ceiling, and hold on zero, below-floor, incomplete, or disputed data. A channel that stays below its floor for four eligible epochs is wound down rather than re-priced upward
5. **Continuous TVL Eligibility:** Only the minimum capital economically owned throughout a complete UTC day receives TVL points
6. **Attributed AMM Fee Growth:** Fee growth is assigned by ownership and liquidity segment, with protocol fees, direct self-dealing, and configured cyclic trades excluded. The subsidy-ratio bound keeps points paid below the fee rewarded, and the per-owner and external-volume caps bound the channel even where related addresses go unidentified
7. **Automatic Allocation and Sequential Unlocks:** Non-transferable finalized points establish TPR entitlement at 1:1. Daily token lots unlock in the same sequence and amounts as points were earned, starting from the separately announced Unlock Start Date
8. **Separate Reserve:** 30M TPR remains outside the routine point budget unless a distinct program is authorized

The normal-case economic design remains intact. The material residual risk is beneficial-ownership detection: an unlinked Sybil trader and LP can evade deterministic self-dealing filters. The program therefore cannot describe AMM rewards as manipulation-proof. What it can state is that the payoff from evasion is bounded without detection: the subsidy-ratio bound keeps the points paid for a dollar of fee below that dollar, so self-dealing requires majority control of a channel's eligible fee flow rather than a minority share, and the per-owner and external-volume caps bound any single owner's take. Concentrated or disputed epochs still require the finalization and governance controls in Sections 2.3 and 4.6.2.

***

## Appendix A: Quick Reference Formulas

**Note:** In TVL formulas, $$e$$ denotes the epoch containing day $$d$$. The multiplier $$\alpha\_p(e)$$ is constant throughout the epoch.

### TVL Point Calculation (per Depeg Pool $$p$$)

| Formula                             | Expression                                                                                                                                                        |
| ----------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Raw TVL Points (daily)              | $$p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d) = \alpha\_p(e) \cdot \overline{H}\_{i,p}(d) \cdot q\_p(d)$$                                                                              |
| Raw TVL Points (epoch, per account) | $$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_{d=d\_1}^{d\_{D(e)}} p\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(d)$$                                                                       |
| Raw TVL Points (epoch, per pool)    | $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_i P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$                                                                               |
| TVL Scaling Factor                  | $$\kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \min\bigl(1, P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) / P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)\bigr)$$; define as 1 when raw points are zero |
| Final TVL Points (per account)      | $$P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \kappa\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) \cdot P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$                                                                  |
| Final TVL Points (per pool)         | $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_i P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$                                                                                                         |
| TVL Points (all pools)              | $$P\_{i,\text{TVL}}(e) = \sum\_p P\_{i,p,\text{TVL}}(e)$$                                                                                                         |

### AMM Point Calculation (per Depeg Pool $$p$$)

| Formula                             | Expression                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| ----------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Raw AMM Points (epoch, per account) | $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \beta\_p(e) \cdot F\_{i,p}(e)$$                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| Raw AMM Points (epoch, per pool)    | $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e) = \sum\_i P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)$$                                                                                                                                                                              |
| AMM Scaling Factor                  | $$\kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \min\bigl(1, P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) / \sum\_i \hat{P}\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)\bigr)$$, computed from the capped amounts $$\hat{P}$$ of Section 4.6, not from raw; define as 1 when that total is zero                   |
| Final AMM Points (per account)      | $$P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \kappa\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) \cdot \hat{P}\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$, where $$\hat{P}$$ is the account's amount after the external-volume and per-owner caps in Section 4.6 and $$\kappa$$ is computed from the sum of those capped amounts |
| Final AMM Points (per pool)         | $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_i P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| AMM Points (all pools)              | $$P\_{i,\text{AMM}}(e) = \sum\_p P\_{i,p,\text{AMM}}(e)$$                                                                                                                                                                                                        |

### Combined Points & Distribution

| Formula                    | Expression                                                                                         |
| -------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Total Points (per account) | $$P\_i(e) = P\_{i,\text{TVL}}(e) + P\_{i,\text{AMM}}(e)$$                                          |
| TPR Entitlement            | $$T\_i(e) = P\_i(e)$$ (1 finalized point = 1 TPR)                                                  |
| Cumulative Points          | $$P\_i^{\text{cumulative}}(E) = \sum\_{e=1}^{E} P\_i(e)$$                                          |
| Program Budget             | $$B\_{\text{free}}(t) = 120{,}000{,}000 - B\_{\text{spent}}(t) - B\_{\text{committed}}(t) \geq 0$$ |

### Multiplier Adjustment

| Formula                   | Expression                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| TVL Multiplier Adjustment | $$\operatorname{clamp}\left(\alpha\_p(e) \cdot \left(P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) / P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{raw}}(e)\right)^{\gamma}, \alpha\_{\min}, \alpha\_{\max}\right)$$, base is the source epoch's multiplier; subject to the observation guards, the per-epoch band, and the rate ceiling |
| AMM Multiplier Adjustment | $$\operatorname{clamp}\left(\beta\_p(e) \cdot \left(P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) / P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{raw}}(e)\right)^{\gamma}, \beta\_{\min}, \beta\_{\max}\right)$$, base is the source epoch's multiplier; subject to the observation guards, the per-epoch band, and the rate ceiling    |
| Per-Epoch Change Band     | $$0.7 \cdot m\_p^{\text{live}} \leq m\_p(e+1) \leq 1.4 \cdot m\_p^{\text{live}}$$ for $$m \in {\alpha, \beta}$$, enforced against the live multiplier and applied before bounds and ceiling; only the latest queued adjustment applies at a boundary                                                       |
| Subsidy-Ratio Bound       | $$\beta\_p(e) \cdot P\_{\text{TPR}} \leq 1$$, so AMM incentive APR never exceeds the pool's natural fee APR                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Rate Ceiling              | $$\alpha\_p(e) \leq R\_{\max,p} / 365$$ and $$\beta\_p(e) \leq \min\bigl(B\_p,\ R\_{\max,p} / (r\_{\text{turnover}} \cdot r\_{\text{fee}} \cdot 365)\bigr)$$, where $$B\_p$$ is $$1/P\_{\text{TPR}}$$ or an approved exception's published ceiling                                                         |

### Target Calculation (Linear Growth Model)

| Formula           | Expression                                                                                                          |
| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Basis TVL         | End-of-epoch TVL in a launch epoch; $$(\text{TVL}*{\text{start}} + \text{TVL}*{\text{end}}) / 2$$ in a steady epoch |
| TVL Point Target  | $$P\_{p,\text{TVL}}^{\text{target}}(e) = \alpha\_p(e) \times \text{Basis TVL} \times D(e)$$                         |
| Expected AMM Fees | $$F\_{\text{expected}} = \text{Basis AMM TVL} \times r\_{\text{turnover}} \times D(e) \times r\_{\text{fee}}$$      |
| AMM Point Target  | $$P\_{p,\text{AMM}}^{\text{target}}(e) = \beta\_p(e) \times F\_{\text{expected}}$$                                  |

### Proposed Token Unlocks

| Item                 | Rule                                                                               |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Point conversion     | Automatic 1:1 TPR entitlement from finalized points; no point transfers or trading |
| Scheduled lot unlock | $$U + (\text{Point\_Earn\_Date}\_{\ell} - T\_0)$$                                  |
| Lot eligibility date | Later of scheduled lot unlock and finalization (Section 5.2)                       |
| Withdrawable amount  | Eligible lots less TPR already withdrawn from them (Section 5.3)                   |
| Unannounced $$U$$    | Allocations can finalize; withdrawals remain unavailable                           |
| Announcing $$U$$     | $$U \geq$$ announcement date + published notice period                             |
| TGE announcement     | Planned when protocol TVL reaches $10 million; separate from the Unlock Start Date |

The proposed schedule is subject to change. See Section 5 for allocation and withdrawal requirements.

***

## Disclaimer

**Everything in this document is subject to change.** It is a working specification of a program that has not completed its rollout. Parameters, multipliers, point targets, epoch durations, budget schedules, the reserve treatment, the point-to-TPR ratio, the proposed token unlock schedule, the Unlock Start Date, and the TGE and public-sale timing and announcement milestone may all be revised or replaced, and the program may be discontinued for future accrual. Changes apply prospectively under the freeze and authorization rules in Sections 2.3 and 4.2.3; finalized ledgers and the entitlements they record are not recalculated retroactively, per Sections 2.4 and 5.3. No figure or date here should be treated as final or as a commitment.

This material is published for information only. It is not an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy, sell, or use any product, token, or security in any jurisdiction, and nothing in it is financial, legal, tax, or investment advice. No advisory or fiduciary relationship is created by reading it. Do your own research. Access to Tapir Protocol is restricted and may be unavailable to persons in certain jurisdictions, including where it would be unlawful.

Point figures, incentive rates, budget schedules, and worked examples are illustrative and depend on stated assumptions. This specification states no US dollar value for TPR and none may be inferred from it. They are not a prediction, valuation, or assurance of any outcome. Illustrative or past figures do not indicate future results. Whether, where, and on what terms points are offered is discretionary and conditional on eligibility. Once points are finalized under the accounting and finalization rules in this document, the 1:1 TPR entitlement follows automatically; points are non-transferable and are not a claim on protocol revenue or on any assured value. Provisional points, ledgers, and displayed balances may be corrected or reduced before finalization.

Tapir is a risk product. Using the protocol carries smart-contract, market, liquidity, yield, oracle, and depeg risk, and participants can lose some or all of their capital. Nothing in this specification reduces those risks or assures any return.

The distribution mechanism described in Section 5 is proposed. Contracts, funding, withdrawal proofs, and release enforcement must be implemented and validated before withdrawals open, and their availability is not assured.
